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Abstract
This paper develops a DSGE model for the United States that features rational inﬂation
inertia and persistence. The model is estimated with Bayesian-estimation techniques and
time-varying inﬂation objectives to account for movements between regimes. After show-
ingthatthemodelproducesforecaststhatarequitecompetitivewithothermethodsweuse
the forecasts of the model to generate more robust Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter end-of-sample
estimates of the output gap.
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Nontechnical Summary
Dynamic general equilibrium models embedding nominal rigidities give rise to the so-called
New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC). These models have been quite successful in capturing
many aspects of the dynamics of aggregate inﬂation and output. But some important problems
remain. The most important is arguably the lack of inﬂation inertia and inﬂation persistence,
and consequently the lack of signiﬁcant real costs of disinﬂations. Inﬂation inertia refers to the
delayed and gradual response of inﬂation to shocks, while inﬂation persistence refers to pro-
longed deviations of inﬂation from steady state following shocks. Another empirical problem
in New Keynesian models is the very small contribution of technology shocks to macroeco-
nomic dynamics.
We address both problems. Larger inﬂation inertia and persistence in our model is obtained by
three interrelated mechanisms. First, the real marginal cost, the main driving force of inﬂation,
is itself inertial. In addition to sticky wages, we propose pricing rigidities in the user cost of
capital. Second, the sensitivity of inﬂation to marginal cost is low. This is achieved by our gen-
eralized upward-sloping marginal cost curve derived from a quadratic cost of deviations of an
individual ﬁrm’s output from industry-average output. Third, for a given marginal cost, ﬁrms’
optimal pricing behavior, in which they set not only the initial price level but also their own up-
dating rule, implies that past inﬂation is a very important determinant of current inﬂation. The
second problem of the small contribution of technology shocks to macroeconomic dynamics is
addressed by an innovative structure of the stochastic process for technology.
The model is estimated with Bayesian techniques. The paper evaluates the model’s performance
in several ways, including statistical ﬁt, out-of-sample forecasts, comparison with other models,
and forecast revisions as new information arrives. These results suggest that the model is quite
competitive when compared to other methods, and we therefore have some conﬁdence in the
model’s ability to ﬁt the data.
We exploit the forecasting performance of the model to develop more reliable real-time mea-
sures of the output gap using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. We do this by using the model’s
forecasts for per capita GDP in each quarter to construct 2-sided measures of the output gap.
We compare the performance of a traditional 1-sided HP ﬁlter with our 2-sided measures for
the interesting downturn in periods 2000Q1 through 2002Q4. We ﬁnd that our 2-sided measure
of the output gap interprets the episode better.Measures of Potential Output 3
1. Introduction
A large body of research in monetary theory uses the assumption of nominal rigidities embed-
ded in dynamic general equilibrium models. This model class, which gives rise to the so-called
New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC), has been quite successful in capturing many aspects
of the dynamics of aggregate inﬂation and output. But some important problems remain, and
have recently been much discussed. The most important is arguably the lack of inﬂation inertia
and inﬂation persistence, and consequently the lack of signiﬁcant real costs of disinﬂations, in
those versions of New Keynesian models that insist on rigorous microfoundations and rational
expectations. Inﬂation inertia refers to the delayed and gradual response of inﬂation to shocks,
whileinﬂationpersistencereferstoprolongeddeviationsofinﬂationfromsteadystatefollowing
shocks. We propose three interrelated ways in which a rational expectations model can address
this problem, and subject their contribution to a Bayesian econometric evaluation. Another em-
pirical problem in New Keynesian models is the very small contribution of technology shocks
to macroeconomic dynamics. We motivate and introduce a way of modeling technology shocks
that increases their contribution to the business cycle.
Given strong empirical evidence on inﬂation inertia1 and on sizeable sacriﬁce ratios during
disinﬂations2, the inability of New Keynesian models to generate these effects is potentially a
serious shortcoming. We survey the literature that has struggled with this problem, and then
suggest a new approach. Ours is a structural, optimizing model with rational expectations. It
relies neither on learning nor on ad hoc lagged terms in the Phillips curve.
The difﬁculties with the empirical performance of New Keynesian models have led different
researchers to very different conclusions about the usefulness of structural modeling of the in-
ﬂation process. On the one hand Rudd and Whelan (2005a/b/c) conclude that current versions
of the NKPC fail to provide a useful empirical description of the inﬂation process, especially
relative to traditional econometric Phillips curves of the sort commonly employed at central
banks for policy analysis and forecasting. On the other hand we have papers like Cogley and
Sbordone (2005) and Coenen and Levin (2004). The former conclude that the conventional
NKPC provides a good representation of the empirical inﬂation process if a shifting trend in the
inﬂation process is allowed for. However, the work of Paloviita (2004) suggests that a shifting
inﬂation trend, while useful to improve the empirical ﬁt of the NKPC, does not remove the
need for an additional lagged inﬂation term. Coenen and Levin (2004) also ﬁnd in favor of
the conventional NKPC, in this case conditional on the presence of a stable and credible mon-
etary policy regime and of signiﬁcant real rigidities. But on the other hand, Altig, Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Linde (2005), who employ similar real rigidities, continue to use indexation
to lagged inﬂation to obtain a good ﬁt for their model. The majority of the profession seems to
hold an intermediate view, exempliﬁed by Gal´ ı, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2005), who ﬁnd that
backward-looking price setting behavior, of the sort that would generate high intrinsic inﬂation
inertia, is quantitatively modest but nevertheless statistically signiﬁcant.3 The research program
exempliﬁed by Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005) and Eichenbaum and Fisher
(2004) also falls into this category.
The view that there is signiﬁcant structural inﬂation inertia left to be explained is our working
hypothesis in this paper. In reviewing the currently dominant approaches that are based on
1 Mankiw (2001), Fuhrer and Moore (1995).
2 Gordon (1982, 1997).
3 However, Rudd and Whelan (2005c) criticize that result on various empirical grounds.4 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
the same working hypothesis, we ﬁnd it useful to distinguish models that do or do not rely on
rational expectations.
The latter category includes learning models such as Erceg and Levin (2003), and ‘sticky in-
formation’ as in Mankiw and Reis (2002). This literature mostly, although not exclusively,
concentrates on private sector learning, or information acquisition, about monetary policy.4 As
such it has been successful in explaining inﬂation behavior observed during transitions between
monetary regimes. But unless it is expanded to cover learning about all shocks in the model, it
has less to say about the persistence observed during periods of stable monetary policy, meaning
persistence in response to non-monetary shocks that affect the driving terms of pricing. Fur-
thermore, learning is not the only candidate to explain persistence during transitions; structural
inertia in a rational expectations model may be another. While we do feel that learning plays
a very important role, the task we set ourselves in this paper is to see how far a rational ex-
pectations model alone, but one that features realistic pricing rigidities, can take us. But at the
same time we want to take account of the results of Cogley and Sbordone (2005) concerning
the importance of a shifting trend in the inﬂation target. As such, our model allows for a unit
root in the central bank’s inﬂation target and uses data on long-term inﬂation expectations to
identify the shocks to that target.
A popular approach to introducing inﬂation inertia into rational expectations models is the ‘hy-
brid’ NKPC, introduced by Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) and Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999). This
combines a rational forward-looking element with some dependence on lagged inﬂation. A
similar role is played by indexation to past inﬂation in the work of Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005) and other more recent work. But Rudd and Whelan (2005c) make an important
point concerning both of these approaches: At least as far as price setting is concerned, their
microfoundations are quite weak, and they are as open to the Lucas critique as the traditional
models they seek to replace. In our work we replace these pricing assumptions with ratio-
nal, forward-looking optimization that is nevertheless capable of generating signiﬁcant inertia.
Moreover, in an important sense our price setting assumptions are less restrictive than even
those of the conventional Calvo model.
Another area of active research within rational expectations models has been models of ﬁrm-
speciﬁc capital.5 A textbook treatment is contained in Woodford (2003). Often, as in the work
of Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005) and Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004), this has
been combined with indexation to generate inertia, and it is not always clear which of the two is
the more important factor, but the work of Coenen and Levin (2004) suggests that ﬁrm-speciﬁc
capital can be powerful even without indexation. The work of Bakshi, Burriel-Llombart, Khan
and Rudolf (2003) shows why this is such an important idea. They demonstrate that conven-
tional price-setting in a Calvo model without ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital has ﬁrms optimally choosing
prices that imply a very large variability in demand and therefore in output. It is clear that in
the real world such variability is very costly to ﬁrms, and one of the many reasons is the cost of
adjusting ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors. If such factors are allowed for, an increase in the ﬁrm’s price, by
reducing demand, lowers marginal cost and thereby the amount by which the price optimally
needs to be raised. Firm-speciﬁc factors need not be limited to capital, but can include labor
adjustment costs, land, time delays to order intermediate goods, etc. In reality probably all of
these are important, but modeling all of them may be too complex. We therefore adopt the same
concept but simplify its modeling by way of a generalized upward-sloping short-run marginal
4 An exception is Ehrmann and Smets (2003), who analyze cost-push shocks.
5 Many authors have combined this with a non-constant elasticity of demand.Measures of Potential Output 5
cost curve. Our analytical results are indistinguishable, in substantive terms, from a model with
ﬁrm speciﬁc capital. We would also add that ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors may not be the main consid-
eration for a ﬁrm in avoiding output/demand volatility. Instead, highly volatile output demand
induced by frequent relative price changes is likely to damage customer relationships, and the
induced volatility in intermediate inputs demand will also damage relationships with suppliers
of those inputs. The recent ECB (2005) survey evidence on price setting suggests that ﬁrms
do indeed cite customer relationships more frequently than input costs as reasons for avoiding
large price changes. Such notions are encompassed in a generalized upward-sloping marginal
cost curve.
Our work generates inﬂation inertia for three interrelated reasons. First, real marginal cost, the
main driving force of inﬂation, is itself inertial. Second, the sensitivity of inﬂation to marginal
cost is low. And third, for a given marginal cost, ﬁrms’ optimal pricing behavior implies that
past inﬂation is a very important determinant of current inﬂation.6 We brieﬂy explain each of
these points in turn.
In realistic dynamic models it is common, and supported by independent empirical evidence,
to introduce real rigidities that imply a delayed response of aggregate demand to shocks. This
in turn implies a delayed response of marginal cost. Our own model follows this literature, in
assuming habit persistence in consumption, investment adjustment costs, and variable capital
utilization. But in addition we assume that each of the components of marginal cost is subject
to pricing rigidities. Wage rigidities are commonly assumed, but if capital enters the production
function, sticky wages alone may not be sufﬁcient to make overall marginal cost inertial. We
propose that user costs of capital are in fact also rigid. Interest rate margins on corporate bank
loans and interest rates on corporate bonds change only infrequently, and so do dividend poli-
cies. As such, it seems doubtful that the prices ﬁrms pay for their capital services are as volatile
as suggested by standard models. Of course we do not provide direct empirical evidence on
this question in this paper, but we can and do assess the implications of this assumption for the
statistical ﬁt of our model.
The sensitivity of inﬂation to marginal cost is low, and it depends on the same factors as in
models of ﬁrm-speciﬁc capital. Our generalized upward-sloping marginal cost curve is derived
from a quadratic cost of deviations of an individual ﬁrm’s output from industry-average output.
Theconsequenceisthatthesensitivityofinﬂationtomarginalcostisdecreasinginthesteepness
of the marginal cost curve and in the price elasticity of demand. The same type of quadratic
term also features in wage setting and in the setting of user costs by an individual provider of
capital, referred to as an intermediary.
Firms’ price setting behavior in our model is both optimizing and forward-looking, yet past
inﬂation becomes an important determinant of current inﬂation. We think of a price setting
ﬁrm as operating in an environment with positive trend inﬂation where collecting and respond-
ing to information about the macroeconomic environment is costly, which is documented as
an important consideration for real world price setting in Zbaracki, Ritson, Levy, Dutta and
Bergen (2004). This idea, which is different from the menu costs idea of Akerlof and Yellen
(1985), can be formally modeled, see Devereux and Siu (2004). But more commonly, as in
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and a large literature that follows Yun (1996), it is
used—without explicit modeling of the adjustment costs—as a rationale for models in which
ﬁrms change prices every quarter but only reoptimize their pricing policies more infrequently.
6 ECB (2005) refers to the ﬁrst two factors as extrinsic persistence, and to the third as intrinsic persistence.6 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
As such these models are not inconsistent with the recent empirical evidence for price set-
ting of Bils and Klenow (2004), Klenow and Kryvtsov (2004), and Golosov and Lucas (2003),
which points to an average frequency of price changes (in the US) of once every 1.5 quarters
for consumer prices. We follow this literature, which therefore posits that in intervals between
reoptimizations ﬁrms follow simple rules of thumb. The critical question is, what is a sensible
rule of thumb? The Yun (1996) approach assumes that ﬁrms set their initial price and there-
after update at the steady state inﬂation rate. But of course this is the approach that has been
found to give rise to almost no inﬂation inertia in New Keynesian models. The indexation ap-
proach of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) addresses that problem by assuming that
non-optimizing ﬁrms index their price to past inﬂation. But in both cases ﬁrms can really only
choose their initial price, while the rule of thumb itself is not a choice variable. This feature is
what has been criticized by Rudd and Whelan (2005b) and some others as not consistent with
the Lucas critique, or ad hoc.
We adopt a different approach—ﬁrms can choose both their initial price level and their rule of
thumb, speciﬁcally the rate at which they update their own price, the ‘ﬁrm-speciﬁc inﬂation
rate’.7 Their objective is to keep them as close as possible to their steadily increasing ﬂexible
price optimum between the times at which price changing opportunities arrive. Furthermore,
as mentioned above, their choice is subject to an increasing ﬁrm-speciﬁc marginal cost curve,
which biases ﬁrms towards adjusting mainly their updating rate unless the shocks they face
are transitory. They would otherwise experience excessive relative price and therefore output
volatility throughout the duration of a pricing policy. At any point in time, this combination of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc pricing policies and ﬁrm-speciﬁc marginal cost curves makes the historic pricing
decisions of currently not optimizing ﬁrms an important determinant of current inﬂation. Or
in other words, past inﬂation is an important determinant of current inﬂation. This is true
even though ﬁrms that do optimize do so under both rational expectations and fully optimizing
behavior. We emphasize that this modeling of price setting, by letting ﬁrms choose two instead
of one pricing variable optimally, imposes fewer exogenous constraints on the ﬁrm’s proﬁt
maximization problem than either the Calvo-Yun model or a model with indexation. In this
important sense the model is therefore less ad hoc.
Finally, note that if price setters behave as in our model, their behavior can be quite similar to
that implied by learning or sticky information in that at any time a large share of ﬁrm speciﬁc
inﬂation rates was chosen based on macroeconomic information available at the time of the
last reoptimization. We expect this similarity to become an important factor once our model is
applied to transitions between different monetary regimes.
In several previous attempts to estimate DSGE models it has been common either to detrend
the data or to assume that total factor productivity follows a trend-stationary process—see Juil-
lard, Karam, Laxton and Pesenti (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2004). We argue that both
approaches impose limitations on the ability of DSGE models to explain key stylized facts at
business cycle frequencies such as the strong comovement between hours worked and aggregate
output. We allow for a more general stochastic process where there are both temporary changes
in the growth rate of total factor productivity as well as highly autocorrelated deviations from
an underlying steady-state growth rate. We show that the latter assumption helps the model to
generate a larger contribution of technology shocks to business cycles.
7 The approach was ﬁrst introduced by Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof (2001, 2002).Measures of Potential Output 7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and section 3
discusses the estimation methodology. Section 4 presents some Bayesian estimation results and
impulse response functions. Section 5 compares the ﬁt and forecasts of the model with other
methods and section 6 uses these forecasts to construct more reliable end-of-sample estimates
of the output gap. The results in this paper should be encouraging for researchers that are
attempting to build DSGE models for both forecasting and policy analysis, but there are a
number of extensions that we are pursuing to improve the speciﬁcation of the model. Section 7
provides some concluding thoughts about useful extensions.
2. The Model
The economy consists of a continuum of measure one of households indexed by i 2 [0;1], a
continuum of ﬁrms indexed by j 2 [0;1], a continuum of ﬁnancial intermediaries indexed by
z 2 [0;1], and a government.
2.1 Households
Household i maximizes lifetime utility, which depends on his per capita consumption Ct(i),
leisure 1 ¡ Lt(i) (where 1 is the ﬁxed time endowment and Lt(i) is labor supply), and real

























Throughout, shocks are denoted by Sx
t , where x is the variable subject to the shock. Households
exhibit external habit persistence with respect to Ci
t, with habit parameter º:
Ht(i) = Ct(i) ¡ ºCt¡1 : (2.2)
Consumption Ct(i) is a CES aggregator over individual varieties ct(i;j), with time-varying




















Households accumulate capital according to
Kt+1(i) = (1 ¡ ¢)Kt(i) + It(i) : (2.5)
We assume that demand for investment goods takes the same CES form as demand for con-
sumption goods, equation (2.3), which implies identical demand functions for goods varieties
j.
In addition to capital, households accumulate money and one period nominal government bonds
Bt(i) with gross nominal return it.8 Their income consists of nominal wage income Wt(i)Lt(i),
8 All ﬁnancial interest rates and inﬂation rates, but not rates of return to capital, are expressed in gross terms.8 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
nominal returns to utilized capital Rk
txtKt(i), where xt is the rate of capital utilization, and





Expenditure consists of consumption spending PtCt(i), investment spending PtIt(i)(1 + SI
t ),
where SI
t is an investment shock, the cost of utilizing capital at a rate different from 100%
Pta(xt)Kt(i), where ¹ x = 1 and a(1) = 0, lump-sum taxation Pt¿t, quadratic capital and invest-
ment adjustment costs, and quadratic costs of deviating from the economywide average labor
supply (more on this below). The budget constraint is therefore











































We assume complete contingent claims markets for labor income, and identical initial endow-
ments of capital, bonds and money. Then all optimality conditions will be the same across
households, except for labor supply. We therefore drop the index i. The multiplier for the bud-
get constraint (2.6) is denoted by ¸t=Pt, and the multiplier of the capital accumulation equation
(2.5) is ¸tqt, where qt is Tobin’s q. Then the ﬁrst-order conditions for ct(j), Bt, Ct, It, Kt+1,
















= ¸t ; (2.9)



































































We will return to the household’s wage setting problem at a later point, as we will be able
to exploit analogies with ﬁrms’ price setting. Full derivations of all ﬁrst-order conditions in
the paper, their transformation into a stationary system through normalization by technology




in demand for individual products arises because each ﬁrm receives its price changing opportu-
nities at different, random points in time. We ﬁrst describe the cost minimization problem and
then move on to proﬁt maximization.
2.2.1 Cost Minimization




























where the expressions in (2.14) state that each ﬁrm employs a CES aggregate of different labor
and capital varieties. Let wt be the aggregate real wage (the cost of hiring the aggregate `t(j)),
and ut the aggregate user cost of capital (the cost of hiring the aggregate kt(j)). These are
determined in competitive factor markets and discussed in more detail below. Then the real










where A = ®¡®(1¡®)¡(1¡®). Technology S
y
t is stochastic and consists of both i.i.d. shocks to
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t = ^ "
iid
t :10 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
Let ~ Yt =
R 1
0 yt(j)dj, `t =
R 1
0 `t(j)dj, and kt =
R 1
0 kt(j)dj. Given that factor markets are
competitive so that all ﬁrms face identical costs of hiring aggregates of capital and labor (2.14),
we can derive the following aggregate input demand conditions:
`t = (1 ¡ ®)
mct
wt




~ Yt : (2.18)
2.2.2 Proﬁt Maximization
Following Calvo (1983) it is assumed that each ﬁrm receives price changing opportunities that
follow a geometric distribution. Therefore the probability (1 ¡ ±) of a ﬁrm’s receiving a new
opportunity is independent of how long ago it was last able to change its price. It is also
independent across ﬁrms, so that it is straightforward to determine the aggregate distribution
of prices. Each ﬁrm maximizes the present discounted value of real proﬁts. The ﬁrst two
determinants of proﬁts are real revenue Pt(j)yt(j)=Pt and real marginal cost mctyt(j). In each







which follows directly from consumer demand functions (2.7) and identical demands from in-
vestors and government (see below). Two key features of our model concern ﬁrst the manner
in which ﬁrms set their prices when they receive an opportunity to do so, and the cost (through
excessively large or small demand) of setting prices far away from prevailing average market
prices Pt. To model the latter, we assume that ﬁrms face a small quadratic cost ©t of deviating
from the output level of its average competitor, meaning the ﬁrm that charges the current market










The term Yt in front of the quadratic term serves as a scale factor. As for price setting, we
assume that when a ﬁrm j gets an opportunity to decide on its pricing policy, it chooses both
its current price level Vt(j) and the gross rate vt(j) at which it will update its price from today
onwards until the time it is next allowed to change its policy. At any time t+k when the time t
policy is still in force, its price is therefore
Pt+k(j) = Vt(j)(vt(j))
k : (2.21)
As for the possibility of introducing even more general price paths, it seems natural to focus
on equilibria characterized by a constant expected long-run growth rate of the nominal anchor.9
The model can then be solved by linearizing around that growth path, in which case it is suf-
ﬁcient to allow ﬁrms to specify their pricing policies up to the growth rate of their price path.
9 This includes both a constant steady state growth rate of the nominal anchor and a unit root in that growth rate,
as in this paper.Measures of Potential Output 11
This permits the use of conventional solution methods, which makes quantitative analysis much
more straightforward.
Firmsdiscountproﬁtsexpectedinperiodt+k bythek-period-aheadrealintertemporalmarginal
rate of substitution and by ±k, the probability that their period t pricing policy will still be in
force k periods from t. They take into account aggregate demand for their output ( 2.19). The
ﬁrm speciﬁc index j can be dropped in what follows because all ﬁrms that receive a price
































We deﬁne the ratio of a new price setter’s ﬁrst period price to the market average price as
pt ´ Vt=Pt, cumulative aggregate inﬂation as ¦t;k ´
Qk
j=1 ¼t+j for k ¸ 1 (´ 1 for k = 0),
and the mark-up term as ¹t = ¾t
¾t¡1. Then the ﬁrm’s ﬁrst order conditions for the choice of its







































The intuition for this result becomes much clearer once these conditions are log-linearized and
combined with the log-linearization of the aggregate price index. As this is algebraically very
involved, the details are presented in the Technical Appendix. We discuss the key equations
here. They replace the traditional one-equation New Keynesian Phillips curve with a three-
equation system in ^ ¼t, ^ vt and an inertial variable ^ Ãt:






+ ^ vt ((1 ¡ ±)(1 + ±)) + ^ Ãt
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2(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ±¯)
(±¯)(1 + Á¹ ¹¹ ¾)
(c mct + ^ ¹t) +
(1 ¡ ±)
(1 + Á¹ ¹¹ ¾)
(Et^ ¹t+1 ¡ ^ ¹t) ;



















2 (1 + Á¹ ¹¹ ¾)
(c mct + ^ ¹t) ;
^ Ãt = ± ^ Ãt¡1 + (1 ¡ ±)^ vt¡1 ¡ ^ "
¼¤
t : (2.27)
Equations (2.25) and (2.26) show the evolution of the two forward-looking variables, ^ ¼t and ^ vt.
The most notable feature is the presence of the term (1 + Á¹ ¹¹ ¾) in the denominator of the terms
multiplying marginal cost. It results from the upward-sloping ﬁrm-level marginal cost curve,
and as long as Á > 0 it makes prices less sensitive to changes in marginal cost. Note that both
the steepness of the marginal cost curve Á and the elasticity of the demand curve ¹ ¾ affect this
term. Equation (2.27) is, in deviation form and allowing for permanent changes in the inﬂation
target ^ "¼¤
t , the weighted average of all those past ﬁrm-speciﬁc inﬂation rates ^ vt that are still in
force between periods t ¡ 1 and t, and which therefore enter into period t aggregate inﬂation.
This term is inertial, and the degree of inertia depends directly on ± and therefore on the average
contract length.





^ pt + ^ Ãt : (2.28)
The two components of this equation reﬂect the two main sources of aggregate inﬂation inertia
in response to shocks. The ﬁrst term ^ pt represents inﬂation caused by signiﬁcant instantaneous
price changes (relative to the aggregate price level) of new price setters. Note that in a Calvo-
Yun model this is the only term driving inﬂation. But in our case the quadratic cost term means
that signiﬁcant instantaneous price changes can be very costly, because it generally causes big
deviations from industry average output during part of the duration of a pricing policy. New
price setters will therefore respond as much as possible through changes in their updating rates
^ vt. But these only slowly feed through to aggregate inﬂation via ^ Ãt, which initially mainly
reﬂects the continuing effects of price updating decisions made before the current realization
of shocks. The result is that past inﬂation, by (2.28) and (2.27), becomes a key determinant of
current inﬂation.
In our sensitivity analysis we will report not only the ﬁt of our model, but also that of a Calvo
(1983) model with Yun (1996) indexation to steady state inﬂation, augmented as in the baseline
case by ﬁrm-speciﬁc marginal cost and sticky user costs. That model, in our case with markup
shocks, gives rise to the following one-equation representation of the inﬂation process, the New
Keynesian Phillips curve:
^ ¼t = ¯^ ¼t+1 +
((1 ¡ ±¯)(1 ¡ ±))
±(1 + Á¹ ¹¹ ¾)
c mct +
(1 ¡ ±)
±(1 + Á¹ ¹¹ ¾)
(^ ¹t ¡ ±¯^ ¹t+1) : (2.29)
This equation can be directly derived from (2.25), (2.26) and (2.27) by setting ^ vt = ^ Ãt = 0. In
other words, a ﬁrm in our model is always free to behave exactly like a Calvo-Yun price setter by
loading all its price changes into the current price. However, this is generally far from optimal,
especially if the processes driving inﬂation are highly persistent. And for aggregate inﬂation
dynamics, as is well known, this kind of price setting implies very little inﬂation inertia and
persistence.Measures of Potential Output 13
2.3 Household Wage Setting
Every ﬁrm j must use composite labor as deﬁned in (2.14), a CES aggregate with elasticity of
substitution ¾w
t of the labor varieties supplied by different households. Firms’ cost minimiza-



















The term driving wage inﬂation is the log-difference between the marginal rate of substitution









Household nominal wage setting can then be shown to follow the same pattern as the price
setting discussed in the previous subsection. With an appropriate change of notation, and after
replacing d mct with [ mrst ¡ ^ wt, it leads to an identical set of equations to (2.25)-(2.28) above.
The reader is referred to the Technical Appendix for details.
2.4 Financial Intermediaries
We assume that all capital is intermediated by a continuum of intermediaries indexed by z 2
[0;1]. These agents are competitive in their input market, renting capital Kt from households at
rental rate rk
t. On the other hand, they are monopolistically competitive in their output market,
lending capital varieties kt(z) to ﬁrms at rental rates ut(z). This gives rise to sluggish user costs
of capital, which interact in the model with sticky wages to produce stickiness in marginal cost.
Sticky user costs imply that the output—capital—of intermediaries is demand determined. The
assumption of variable capital utilization is therefore essential to allow the market for capital
services to clear in the presence of sticky user costs.
Every ﬁrm j must use composite capital as deﬁned in (2.14), a CES aggregate with elasticity of


















The proﬁt maximization problem of the intermediary follows the same pattern as ﬁrms’ prob-
lem. We deﬁne the gross intermediation spread as st = ut=rk
t. With an appropriate change of
notation and after replacing d mct with ¡^ st, we obtain an identical set of equations to (2.25)-
(2.28) above. The Technical Appendix contains the details.14 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
2.5 Government
We assume that there is an exogenous stochastic process for government spending GOVt
GOVt = S
gov
t GOV ; (2.35)
with demands for individual varieties having the same form as consumption demand for vari-
eties (2.7). The government’s ﬁscal policy is assumed to be Ricardian, with the government
budget balanced period by period through lump-sum taxes ¿t, and with an initial stock of gov-




= GOVt : (2.36)
We assume that the central bank pursues an interest rate rule for its policy instrument it. Its
quarterly inﬂation target ¼¤








The year-on-year inﬂation rate is denoted as ¼4;t = ¼t¼t¡1¼t¡2¼t¡3. The current year-on-year




























t is an autocorrelated monetary policy shock. A government policy is deﬁned as a set
of stochastic processes fis, ¿sg
1






the conditions (2.36) and (2.38) hold for all s ¸ t.
2.6 Equilibrium
An allocation is given by a list of stochastic processes fBs, Ms, Cs, Is, Ls, Ks, ks, Ys , Lt(i;j),
kt(z;j), i;j;z 2 [0;1]g
1















Then the equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:10
An equilibrium is an allocation, a price system, a government policy and shock processes such
that
(a) given the government policy, the price system, shock processes, the restrictions on wage
setting, and the process fLsg
1
s=t, the allocation and the processes fV w
s (i), vw
s (i), i 2 [0;1]g
1
s=t
solve households’ utility maximization problem,
(b) given the government policy, the price system, shock processes, the restrictions on price
setting, and the process fYsg
1
s=t, the allocation and the processes fVs(j), vs(j), j 2 [0;1]g
1
s=t
solve ﬁrms’ cost minimization and proﬁt maximization problem,
10 Except for bonds we only show log-linearized market clearing conditions. Their derivation from market clearing
conditions in levels, including aggregation, is presented in the Technical Appendix.Measures of Potential Output 15
(c) given the government policy, the price system, shock processes, the restrictions on setting






s(z), z 2 [0;1]g
1
s=t solve interme-
diaries’ proﬁt maximization problem,
(d) the goods market clears at all times,
¹ Y ^ Yt = ¹ C ^ Ct + ^ It + GOV \ GOV t ; (2.39)






^ Lt(i;j)didj ; (2.40)
(f) the market for capital clears at all times,
^ kt = ^ xt + ^ Kt ; (2.41)
(g) the bond market clears at all times,
Bt = 0 : (2.42)
3. Estimation Methodology, Priors, and Calibration
3.1 Estimation Methodology
The model above is log-linearized and then estimated in two steps in DYNARE-MATLAB. In
the ﬁrst step, we compute the posterior mode using an optimization routine (CSMINWEL) de-
veloped by Chris Sims. Using the mode as a starting point, we then use the Metropolis-Hasting
(MH) algorithm to construct the posterior distributions of the model and the marginal likeli-
hood.11 We choose as our baseline case a particular combination of structural model features
and priors for parameters, and use the parameter estimates for this case to construct impulse
responses. Sensitivity analysis will be performed either by restricting certain parameters or
shocks, or by removing some features of the structural model, and by comparing the marginal
likelihood to that of the baseline case.
3.2 The Role of Unit Roots
Recent efforts at estimating DSGE models have been based mainly on data that were detrended
either with linear time trends or with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter—for examples see Smets and
Wouters (2004) and Juillard and others (2005). More recently there have been attempts to use
Bayesian methods to help identify more ﬂexible stochastic processes that contain permanent,
or unit-root components—see Adolfson and others (2005). This recent work is encouraging
11 For one estimation run the whole process takes anywhere from 6 to 8 hours to complete using a Pentium 4
processor (3.0 GHz) on a personal computer with 1GB of RAM. DYNARE includes a number of debugging
features to determine if the optimization routines have truly found the optimum and if enough draws have been
executed for the posterior distributions to be accurate.16 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
because it could potentially eliminate distortions in inference that can arise from preﬁltering
data.
Failing to account adequately for variation in the perceived underlying inﬂation objectives in
DSGE models should be expected to seriously overstate the degree of structural inﬂation inertia
and persistence if the model was estimated over a sample that had signiﬁcant regime changes,
with the central bank acting to change the underlying rate of inﬂation—see Erceg and Levin
(2003). A similar argument applies to detrending inﬂation and interest rates with any procedure
that removes too little or too much of the variation and persistence in the data.
Detrending productivity inappropriately could also bias key parameters that inﬂuence macro-
economic dynamics, as the behavioral responses of consumption, labor effort and investment
will depend intricately on agents’ forecasts of the future path of productivity. For example, un-
der the assumption that productivity shocks are temporary deviations from a time trend standard
models would predict a small rise in both consumption and leisure in the short run as the ad-
ditional wealth generated by a productivity improvement would be consumed by distributing it
over time. But an increase in leisure during periods of booms is at complete odds with the data
at business cycle frequencies, which suggests clearly that GDP and hours worked are strongly
and positively correlated. We show that if the model is extended to allow for shocks that result
in highly persistent deviations of productivity growth from its long-term steady-state rate, it can
generate a short-run positive correlation between output and hours, albeit only in the very short
run. While the improvement is limited, we can nevertheless conclude that models which do not
allow for a more ﬂexible stochastic process for productivity run the risk of underestimating the
importance of productivity shocks and producing signiﬁcant bias in the model’s key structural
parameters.
For the reasons sketched out above we generally prefer to allow for unit roots in both underlying
inﬂation objectives and the level of productivity, but we recognize that the case for the former
in particular will obviously depend on the country and the sample that is being studied.12 Over
our sample with US data, which starts in the early 1990s, allowing for a unit root in inﬂation
objectives is necessary because there is ample and convincing evidence that long-term inﬂation
forecasts have declined signiﬁcantly from values around 4 percent at the beginning of our sam-
ple to values around 2.5 percent at the end of the sample. Figure 7.1 plots three measures of
long-term inﬂation expectations and the 10-year government bond yield, and all of them sug-
gest that there was a gradual reduction in the perceived inﬂation target. A similar argument
applies for productivity over this sample. Figure 7.2 reports measures of expected long-term
growth from the same surveys and conﬁrms that perceived long-term growth prospects for the
United States have been revised up signiﬁcantly over the last decade and have remained persis-
tently higher than in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. Note that such revisions in growth prospects
are completely inconsistent with a trend-stationary view of productivity, which predicts that pe-
riods of above-trend levels should be followed by slower medium-term growth as the level of
productivity reverts back to trend.
To estimate the model with unit roots in both productivity and inﬂation it was necessary to
normalize the model by both technology and the inﬂation target, and to then transform it into a
12 For example, it may not be necessary to control for shifts in perceived inﬂation objectives in inﬂation-targeting
countries over samples where the central bank has established a track record and managed to anchor long-term
inﬂation expectations—see Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004), Batini, Kuttner and Laxton (2005), G¨ urkaynak,
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linearized form. Unlike a previous version of this paper that expressed all growing observable
variables in ﬁrst differences, the model is now estimated directly in levels.
3.3 Data and Data Transformations
Our sample period covers 63 quarterly observations from 1990Q2 through 2005Q4. We employ
the same 7 observable variables that have been employed in other studies (GDP, consumption,
investment, hours, real wage, Fed funds rate, and inﬂation, as measured by the implicit GDP
deﬂator), but we have added as an additional variable a measure of long-term inﬂation expec-
tations to help identify perceived movements in the Fed’s underlying inﬂation objectives. This
measure is taken from a survey by Consensus Economics, which measures expected inﬂation
between 6 and 10 years in the future, a period that is sufﬁciently far ahead for inﬂation to be
expected to be equal to the target on average. The data for GDP, consumption, investment, and
real wages are all measured on a per capita basis and the data for the Fed funds rate and the
inﬂation rate (GDP deﬂator) are measured as annualized log ﬁrst differences of the gross rate.
The only variable that is measured in (de-meaned) log levels is hours worked per person.
Real GDP, investment, consumption and the GDP price deﬂator are taken from the US NIPA
accounts. Hours worked are taken from the Labor Force Survey. The real wage is calculated by
dividing labor income (from US NIPA) by hours and the GDP deﬂator.
3.4 Calibrated Parameters
The only parameters needed to be calibrated relate to time resources. These include a quarterly
discount rate ¯ set to 0.999 and steady state ratio of available working time set to 1
3:The latter
only pins down units of some unobservable variables in the model.
All the other parameters including those which determine the steady state are estimated.
3.5 Speciﬁcation of the Stochastic Processes
Table 7.1 reports the speciﬁcations of the stochastic processes for the 10 structural shocks in the
model.13 Following Juillard and others (2005) we classify shocks as demand and supply shocks
depending on the short-run covariance they generate between inﬂation and real GDP. Shocks
that raise demand by more than supply and cause inﬂation to rise in the short run are classiﬁed
as demand shocks, while shocks that produce a negative covariance between inﬂation and GDP
are classiﬁed as supply shocks. Based on this classiﬁcation system, shocks to government
absorption, the Fed funds rate, the inﬂation target, consumption, and investment, [d s
gov





t ], are all classiﬁed as demand shocks. Shocks to wage and price markups as well
as labor supply shocks, [c ¹w
t ,b ¹t, b sL
t ], are classiﬁed as supply shocks. Both markup shocks are
assumed to have zero serial correlation, as otherwise the autocorrelation coefﬁcients would
pick up most of the observed inﬂation inertia, rather than the multiple and competing structural
features of the model. The remaining two shocks determine the growth rate of productivity.
The classiﬁcation of the b giid
t shock is simple because increases in its value make output rise
and inﬂation fall. However, the classiﬁcation of the b g
gr
t shock as a demand or supply shock is
more difﬁcult. Interestingly, when shocks to this component are highly serially correlated they
generate responses that share characteristics with what many professional forecasters would
13 In their model of the US economy, Smets and Wouters (2004) also allow for ten structural shocks, six of which
are speciﬁed as ﬁrst-order stochastic processes and four of which are assumed to be white noise.18 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
characterize as shocks to consumer and business conﬁdence in that they result in sustained
increases in aggregate demand and a temporary, but persistent, increase in inﬂation.
3.6 Prior Distributions
Our assumptions about the prior distributions can be grouped into two categories: (1) parame-
ters for which we have relatively strong priors based on our reading of existing empirical evi-
dence and their implications for macroeconomic dynamics, and (2) parameters where we have
fairly diffuse priors. Broadly speaking, parameters in the former group include the core struc-
tural parameters that inﬂuence, for example, the lags in the monetary transmission mechanism,
while parameters in the latter category include the parameters that characterize the stochastic
processes (i.e., the variances of the shocks and the degree of persistence in the shock processes).
The ﬁrst, fourth and ﬁfth columns of Table 7.2 report our assumptions about the prior distribu-
tions for the 21 structural core parameters of the model. The second and third columns report
the posterior mode estimates and standard errors of the parameters. The assumptions about and
results for the remaining parameters are reported in a similar format in Tables 7.3 and 7.4.
3.6.1 Priors about Structural Parameters (Table 7.2)
Habit Persistence in Consumption [v]: We set the prior at 0.85 as high values are required to
generate realistic lags in the monetary transmission mechanism and hump-shaped consumption
dynamics—see Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004) for a discussion of the role of habit per-
sistence in generating hump-shaped consumption dynamics in response to interest rate shocks.
This prior is somewhat higher than other studies such as Boldrin, Christiano and Fisher (2001),
who use a value of 0.7.
Frisch Elasticity of Labor Supply [°]: We set the prior at 0.50. Pencavel (1986) reports that most
microeconomic estimates of the Frisch elasticity are between 0 and 0.45, and our calibration is
at the upper end of that range, in line with much of the business cycle literature. 14
Adjustment Costs on Changing Capital and Investment [µk;µi]: We set priors equal to 5 and 50
for µk and µi. These assumptions are based on analyzing the simulation properties of the model.
The data do not seem to have much to say about these parameters other than that they cannot be
zero or very large. This is not uncommon.
Duration of Pricing Policies [±;±w;±k]: The duration of pricing policies is (1=(1 ¡ ±)): In the
base case we set the prior equal to a three quarters duration for prices, wages and user costs,
therefore the priors equal 0.66 for [±;±w;±k ]. This is based on our reading of the empirical
literature for the US and on the results cited in ECB (2005). In the US, consumer prices are
re-set on average (slightly faster than) every two quarters, while the average for producer prices
is four quarters. As our model does not distinguish between the two, it seems reasonable to
choose an intermediate prior of three quarters. The priors for wages and user costs are set to the
same value, but for user costs we will consider alternatives in the sensitivity analysis.
Steepness of Marginal Cost Curve [Á;Áw;Ák]: Simulation experiments with the model suggest
that plausible values for these parameters might fall between 0.50 and 2.0. In our base case we
14 As discussed by Chang and Kim (2005), a very low Frisch elasticity makes it difﬁcult to explain cyclical ﬂuctu-
ations in hours worked, and they present a heterogeneous agent model in which aggregate labor supply is consid-
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set the prior at 1.0. Our sensitivity analysis includes a case where all three of these parame-
ters are restricted to be zero. There are signiﬁcant interactions between these adjustment cost
parameters and the duration parameters that will be explained below.
Interest Rate Reaction Function [»int;»¼;»y]: We impose prior means of 0.75, 0.25, 0.50 to be
consistent with previous work, but we make these priors diffuse to allow them to be inﬂuenced
signiﬁcantly by the data.
Steady State Parameters: We set the mean of the quarterly steady-state rate of productivity
growth ¹ g to 1.0042, which implies an annual rate of 1.7 percent, the average over our sample.
The rate of productivity growth and quarterly discount rate ¯ together pin down the equilibrium
real interest rate of 2.1 percent. The quarterly depreciation rate on capital ¢ is assumed to
be 0.025, implying an annual depreciation rate of 10 percent. The prior means of elasticities
of substitution among goods, labor inputs and capital inputs ¾;¾w;¾k are assumed to be 5.35,
7.25 and 11.00 respectively, resulting in markups of 23%, 16% and 10%. The prior for the
labor income share ls is set to 0.58. This prior combined with the assumptions on elasticities
of substitutions results in a share of capital in valued added of 0.28 and a capital-to-GDP ratio
of 1.71. Further, the prior for government absorption gs is set to 18 percent of GDP in steady
state. These assumptions imply that 62 percent remains for consumption and 20 percent for
investment. Most of these values are similar to what have been employed in other DSGE models
of the US economy—see Juillard and others (2005) and Bayoumi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004).
There are two exceptions. First, the share of capital of 0.28 looks lower than what is typically
assumed, but this is the share in value added, not in output. Capital’s share in output includes
monopoly proﬁts from three sectors, and is reasonable at 41 percent. Second, the mark-up in
ﬁnancial intermediation is a new concept in this literature. Our intuition is that this sector is
more competitive than the goods and labor markets.
3.6.2 Priors about Structural Shocks (Tables 7.3- 7.4)
Persistence parameters for the structural shocks [½gov, ½inv, ½c, ½int, ½gr, ½L, ½¹, ½¹w]: Table
7.3 reports the assumptions about the priors for these parameters. With the exception of the
shocks to the markups and the autocorrelated productivity shocks we set the prior means equal
to 0.85 with a fairly diffuse prior standard deviation of 0.10. For the two markup shocks we
impose zero serial correlation. These priors are consistent with other studies such as Smets and
Wouters (2004) and Juillard, Karam, Laxton and Pesenti (2005).
We treat the prior on the serial correlation parameter for the productivity shocks differently.
Here, we utilize a tight prior so that the model can generate highly persistent movements in the
growthraterelativetoitslong-runsteadystate. Asmentionedearlier, thisisnecessarytoexplain
some facts in our sample (persistent upward revisions in expectations of medium-term growth
prospects), but it is also more consistent with the data over the last century in the United States
and other countries, where productivity growth has departed from its long-term average growth
rate for as long as decades in many cases. Obviously, there will not be a lot of information in
our short sample for estimating this parameter.15 We are considering adding expectations of
long-term productivity growth to the list of observable variables to help identify this parameter,
but have not attempted to do so at this point.
15 Provided the researcher can provide sensible priors, Bayesian techniques offer a major advantage over other
system estimators such as maximum likelihood, which in small samples can often allow key parameters such as
this one to wander off in nonsensical directions.20 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
Structural shocks standard errors [¾^ "gov , ¾^ "inv, ¾^ "c, ¾^ "int, ¾^ "¼¤, ¾^ "iid, ¾^ "gr , ¾^ "L, ¾^ "¹, ¾^ "¹w]:
Table 7.4 reports our assumptions about the priors for these parameters. The strategy here was
to develop rough priors of the means by looking at the model’s impulse response functions,
conditional on all the other priors, and then to form a diffuse prior around this mean in order
to let the data adjust the parameters in a way that improves the overall ﬁt of the model. The
speciﬁc values for these priors are not intuitive, as they require a very detailed knowledge of the
structure of the model.
4. Estimation Results
4.1 Parameter Estimates
The posterior mode for habit persistence is 0:73, which is above our prior of 0:85. The data and
model seem to conﬁrm our prior for the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and imply a slightly
larger adjustment cost parameter estimate on investment changes (52:9 versus 50:0). The pa-
rameter estimates of the policy rule imply a slightly higher coefﬁcient on the deviation of the
inﬂation forecast from the perceived target (0:32 versus 0:25), a signiﬁcantly higher estimate of
the interest rate smoothing term (0:95 versus 0:75) and a lower estimate on the deviation of the
output growth rate from the technology growth rate (0:50 versus 0:34).
The posterior estimates for the parameters that determine pricing duration are lower than the
prior means for wages (0:59 versus 0:66), and higher for prices (0:71 versus 0:66). According to
these estimates, the mean durations of pricing policies are 10.3 months in the goods market, 9.3
months in the capital market, and 7.3 months in the labor market. The parameters determining
the steepness of the marginal cost curve change little in all three markets (1:03, 1:01 and 0:96
versus 1:00). Broadly speaking, the range of parameter estimates does not look implausible.
The parameter estimates for the structural shock processes are reported in Tables 7.3 and 7.4.
TheresultsforthestandarderrorsinTable7.4arenoteasytointerpretwithoutunderstandingthe
model’s properties (IRFs and variance decompositions). The estimates of the serial correlation
parameters in Table 7.3 are more interesting. Aside from the persistent productivity growth
shocks, the shock with the highest degree of serial correlation is government spending (0:99).
16 Unsurprisingly, the data do not have very much of an inﬂuence over the parameter estimate
of the growth shocks, producing a posterior mean that is nearly equal to the prior. What is
most signiﬁcant about these results is that our priors of a high degree of serial correlation for all
processes are within the estimated 90% conﬁdence intervals. This means among other things
that the shocks driving pricing are highly persistent, and as such generally require an optimal
pricing response that makes ﬁrms change their ﬁrm-speciﬁc inﬂation rates. A model that rules
this out imposes strong restrictions on optimal behavior and on macroeconomic dynamics.
4.2 Impulse Response Functions
4.2.1 The IRFs for Demand Shocks
Figure 7.3 reports the impulse responses for a one-standard deviation increase in the Fed funds
rate. The Fed funds rate increases by about 20 basis points and as a result output, consumption,
investment, hours worked, and the real wage all fall in the short run and display hump-shaped
dynamics that trough after about three to four quarters. There is a similar small reduction in
year-on-year inﬂation (which lags behind output) reﬂecting the signiﬁcant inertia in the inﬂa-
16 Note that in the data this variable is a residual that includes the current account.Measures of Potential Output 21
tion process. Figure 7.4 reports the results for a permanent increase in the inﬂation target of .08
percentage points. As can be seen in the Figure this requires a temporary, but persistent, reduc-
tion in real and nominal interest rates, which results in a temporary boost to GDP, consumption,
investment and hours worked. Figure 7.5 reports the results for a shock to government ab-
sorption. This shock is expansionary in the short run and induces higher output and work effort.
However, to restrain inﬂationary forces, real interest rates rise and this crowds out consumption.
Investment and work effort remain high for an extended period because this shock is estimated
to be highly persistent. For the consumption shock in Figure 7.6, consumption rises in the short
run and this eventually requires an increase in real interest rates to return inﬂation back to the in-
ﬂation target. Inﬂation is highly persistent for this shock, and also for the (negative) investment
shock in Figure 7.7. Here investment falls over the medium term and the fall in the real interest
rate crowds in consumption sufﬁciently in the short run to generate the savings necessary to
ﬁnance the higher level of investment. However, over time the lower level of capital requires
a lower level of consumption. Finally, and as can be seen in all of these ﬁgures, inﬂation and
output co-vary positively in the short run.
4.2.2 The IRFs for Supply Shocks
Figure 7.8 reports the results for a shock that reduces the wage markup and expands labor
supply. In this case, the real wage falls and there is an expansion in output, hours worked,
consumption and investment. Inﬂation falls and the Fed funds rate is reduced over time to
gradually push inﬂation back up to its target. Figure 7.9 deals with a shock that reduces the price
markup. This has very similar short-run qualitative effects to a wage-markup shock, except that
the real wage rises in the short run. Figure 7.10 reports the results for a negative shock to
labor supply. This induces an increase in the real wage and results in a reduction in output,
consumption, investment and hours worked. Finally, we note that under all of these shocks, a
negative covariance exists between output and inﬂation in the short run.
4.2.3 The IRFs for Productivity Shocks
Figure 7.11 reports the results for a temporary shock to the growth rate of productivity. While
this results in an increase in output, consumption, investment and the real wage, there is a
reduction in hours worked as workers consume more leisure. As pointed out by Gali (1999) and
others, this feature severely constrains the potential role of productivity shocks in DSGE models
as it implies a counterfactual strong negative correlation between hours worked and output.
Figure 7.12 shows that this problem is less severe with a persistent shock to the growth rate of
productivity. GDP, consumption, investment, productivity and the real wage all trend up over
time and have not converged to their new long-run values after a decade. Because it takes time
to put capital into place, in the very short run the increase in output is accomplished partly
through an increase in hours worked. However, as investment rises hours worked eventually
decline and in the very long run return back to baseline. This last requirement is a condition for
balanced growth. In the very short run inﬂation rises as demand increases by more than supply.
Consequently, real interest rates rise in part to constrain these short-run inﬂationary forces, but
they also rise persistently as the marginal product shifts upwards and then falls slowly over time
until the level of the capital stock increases to its new steady-state level.
4.2.4 The Importance of Pricing Policies for Inﬂation Dynamics
Figure 7.13 illustrates the effect on inﬂation dynamics of the average contract length ±, ±w, and
±kand the steepness of the marginal cost curve Á, Áw, and Ák. For the purpose of this exercise we22 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
maintain all parameters at those of our baseline experiment while allowing for different values
of these six parameters. The shock we consider is a permanent increase in the inﬂation target
by one percent per annum. We consider 16 cases, ranging from fast to slow price adjustment
(± = 0:25, 0:5, 0:75, 0:9) and from ﬂat to steep marginal cost curves (Á = 0:5, 1, 2, 5). Two
results stand out.
First, the most interesting difference between these parameter combinations concerns inﬂation
inertia, rather than persistence. Inertia is dramatically lower for slower speeds of price adjust-
ment, while higher speeds of price adjustment are characterized by an initial overshooting (by
a factor of two) of inﬂation over its new target. Note that a standard New Keynesian model
without indexation would exhibit no inertia whatsoever for a shock to the inﬂation target; inﬂa-
tion would immediately converge to the new target. In our model persistence would increase
dramatically for very long contract lengths, as shown in the last row of plots. Contracts of such
length are, however, clearly rejected by the data.
Second, the steepness of the marginal cost curve matters far less than contract length for this
particular shock. In order for past inﬂation to become an important determinant of current
inﬂation, historic pricing policies with their history of updating behavior must remain in force
at least for some time. Otherwise even very steep marginal cost curves will not prevent ﬁrms
from rapidly adjusting their prices, because they can do so in anticipation of soon being able to
readjust their price again.17
5. Model Validation and Forecasting Performance
This section examines the model’s ability to forecast. We begin by evaluating the model’s ﬁt
by comparing the model’s marginal data density with those from Bayesian VARs. Next, we
examine the out-of-sample forecasting performance for inﬂation, output and the Fed funds rate
by comparing the model’s out-of-sample root-mean-square errors (RMSEs) with ﬁve alternative
forecasting approaches. This includes the Fed’s judgmental Greenbook forecasts, the Fed’s
MAQS DSGE model, as well as a BVAR, VAR and random walk model (RW).18 Interestingly,
we ﬁnd that the model performs quite well when compared to these other methods, but our
conclusions with respect to the Greenbook forecasts (GB) are tentative as we do not have a
sample that includes any recessions and large turning points for the economy. In the last part of
this section we show how the model interprets new data and decompose revisions in medium-
term forecasts into demand and supply components.
5.1 Comparing the Model’s Fit with BVARS
The marginal data density provides a very useful summary statistic of the overall ﬁt of the
model and can be compared directly with other DSGE models estimated on the same data set or
less restricted models such as vector autoregressive models (VARS). In cases where researchers
17 This also suggests that the empirical ﬁnding of a very short contract length in Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum
and Linde (2005) may have more to do with the non-rational price updating behavior of their ﬁrms than with their
estimated steepness of their marginal cost curve.
18 The Fed’s MAQS DSGE model was developed principally by Rochelle Edge, Jean-Pierre Laforte and Michael
Kiley in the Macroeconomic and Quantitative Studies Section at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System—see Edge, Kiley and Laforte (2006a).Measures of Potential Output 23
have not preﬁltered the data with some detrending technique the marginal data density will also
provide a direct measure of out-of-sample forecasting performance.19
In addition to comparing the ﬁt of different DSGE models, it is also possible to compare their
marginal data densities with the marginal data densities of Bayesian VARS—see Sims (2003)
and Schorfheide (2004). 20 Table 7.5 reports the marginal likelihood of eight BVARs (1 to 8
lags) based on Sims and Zha (1998) priors.21 The BVAR estimates were obtained by combining
a speciﬁc type of the Minnesota prior with dummy observations. The prior decay and tightness
parameters are set at 0.5 and 3, respectively. As in Smets and Wouters (2004), the parameter
determining the weight on own-persistence (sum-of-coefﬁcients on own lags) is set at 2 and the
parameter determining the degree of co-persistence is set at 5. To obtain priors for the error
terms we followed Smets and Wouters (2004) by using the residuals from an unconstrained
VAR(1) estimated over a sample of observations that was extended back to 1980Q1.22 The
estimates reported in Table 7.5 suggest that the best ﬁtting BVAR has 4 lags. As can be seen
in the top row of Table 7.5 the estimates of the marginal data density obtained from 500,000
replications of the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm using the modiﬁed harmonic mean formula
suggested by Geweke shows that the DSGE model provides a better ﬁt than the best ﬁtting
BVAR over this sample. To test whether this was the result of the speciﬁc sample of obser-
vations that was used to develop priors for the error terms in the BVAR we considered two
alternative shorter samples (1987:1-1990:2 and 1984:1-1990:2), but in both cases none of the
BVARs produced a better ﬁt than the DSGE model. We also considered the procedure suggested
by Schorfheide (2004) for setting the priors on the error terms using the standard error of the
endogenous variables on the presample and obtained the same basic ﬁndings. While the esti-
mates of the marginal data density of each BVAR changed for each sample none of the BVARS
ﬁt as well as the DSGE model.
5.2 More Comparisons of Forecasting Performance
In a recent paper Edge, Kiley and Laforte (EKL: 2006b) compare the out-of-sample forecasting
performance of a DSGE model they have developed at the Fed with the judgmental Greenbook
19 One problem with preﬁltering data such as output with ﬁlters such as the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter prior to esti-
mation is that uncertainty in the estimates of the trend will not be accounted for by the estimates of the marginal
data density of the estimated model. In other words, when researchers preﬁlter the data before estimation there
will no longer be a direct correspondence between in-sample ﬁt and out-of-sample forecasting performance. This
problem with preﬁltering data has not been limited to empirical work on DSGE models, but has plagued most of
the empirical work on the generation of macro models that DSGE models are being developed to replace.
20 It is well known that large dimensional unrestricted VAR models do not forecast very well without imposing
some priors on the parameters and for that reason we compare the ﬁt of the DSGE model with Bayesian VARs
instead of unrestricted VARs. It is important to stress that we do not consider the BVARs as serious alternatives
to a structural view about how the economy works because they offer little useful in this dimension, but they
do provide a potentially useful metric for comparing the ﬁt and out-of-sample forecasting performance of DSGE
models when there is a paucity of alternative DSGE models readily available that can be used to assess any speciﬁc
model. Because BVARs have been developed principally as forecasting models this approach might seem to
suggest that the deck is being stacked against DSGE models, which in many cases impose serious cross-equation
restrictions that could easily be rejected by the data.
21 The marginal likelihood values for the BVAR were computed in DYNARE using a program developed by Chris
Sims.
22 The DSGE model was estimated over a sample from 1990Q3-2005Q2. This choice was based on available
measures of long-term inﬂation expectations from Consensus Economics. To extend our measure of long-term
inﬂation expectations back we used an alternative measure available from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
As can be seen in Figure 7.1 the measure of long-term inﬂation expectations from the Consensus Economics survey
displays a similar pattern as the measure from the Survey of Professional Forecasters over the sample where both
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forecasts prepared by Federal Reserve Board staff as well as forecasts from 3 simple reduced-
formmodels, whichincludedaVAR,aBayesianVARandasimplerandomwalk(RW)model.23
While the sample period that EKL study is limited to forecasts covering the period August 1996
to March 2000 and does not contain any signiﬁcant turning points in the economy as a result
of recessions, this period is still of some interest because the economy produced signiﬁcantly
higher output growth than was anticipated by most forecasters—see Figure 7.2, which shows
that the Consensus forecasts of trend GDP growth were not revised upwards in response to
higher actual growth in the mid-1990s until just before the recession in 2001.
Tables 7.6 to 7.8 report the RMSEs for per capita GDP, the GDP deﬂator and the Fed funds rate
for the 5 models and the Greenbook forecasts.24 Before presenting the estimates it is important
to emphasize that while forecasting performance is the only objective criterion for evaluating
alternative models, it is important to bear in mind when performing horse races of this type
that sometimes even the worst horse can win a race if the track is short enough or through
happenstance just happens to have the perfect conditions on a particular day and track.
5.2.1 Results for Per Capita GDP
Table7.6reportstheRMSEsforGDPpercapitaoverhorizonsof1, 4and8quarters. Ourmodel,
which is reported as DSGE-JKKL in the table, clearly wins the race at long horizons, producing
an RMSE which is signiﬁcantly better than all the models and 1/2 as large as the Greenbook
forecasts. Note, however, that at horizons as short as 1 quarter the Greenbook forecasts and
the Bayesian VAR do slightly better than the other models, suggesting that there may be an
advantage to using a less-structured approach for near-term forecasting. As indicated earlier,
the particular sample studied by EKL and here does not include any recessions and therefore
may underestimate the value of the Greenbook forecasts. Obviously, we are looking forward to
the release of the Greenbook forecasts that cover the 2001 recession and subsequent recovery
to see if the beneﬁts of the Greenbook forecasts become even larger when there are interesting
turning points in the sample.
5.2.2 Results for the GDP Deﬂator
Table 7.7 reports the results for the GDP deﬂator. Now the Greenbook forecasts dominate
the other forecasts at the 8-quarter horizon and the DSGE-JKKL is slightly better at the 1-
quarter horizon. One interpretation for why the Greenbook forecasts may dominate at longer
horizons is that Fed staff may have more information about the underlying preferences of Fed
policymakers concerning medium-term inﬂation objectives than what is embodied explicitly in
the 2 DSGE models, or implicitly in the assumptions of the reduced-form models. It remains to
be seen if the favorable performance of DSGE-JKKL at the 1-quarter horizon is simply a result
of ignoring data revisions to the national accounts. The DSGE-JKKL model also dominates
the forecasts of DSGE-EKL at longer horizons, so it would be interesting to study in more
detail what assumptions in the two models are capable of accounting for such differences. The
superior performance of the DSGE-JKKL model may not be surprising since the major focus
of developing this model has been to improve output-inﬂation dynamics, so it would have been
somewhat disappointing if it did not compare favorably to more conventional models that have a
23 We are indebted to Jean-Philippe Laforte for providing the RMSEs for the Greenbook forecasts and other models
that we use here. For graphs of the RMSEs for GDP and the GDP deﬂator see Figure 3 of Edge, Kiley and Laforte
(2006b).
24 The tables do not include estimates for the Fed funds rate for the Greenbook forecasts because these data are not
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simpler speciﬁcation for inﬂation dynamics.25 It is also important to emphasize that the DSGE-
EKL model offers other features by providing a more detailed decomposition of GDP into
components, thereby providing a framework for addressing questions that cannot be adequately
addressed with highly aggregated models.
5.2.3 Results for the Fed Funds Rate
Table 7.8 reports the results for the Fed funds rate. At the 1-quarter horizon DSGE-JKKL
is the clear loser, producing an RMSE that is about double what is produced from the other
models. However, at longer horizons DSGE-JKKL clearly wins the race, with the random walk
model (RW) coming in second. Two points need to be mentioned here. First, in this particular
sample the Fed funds rate was roughly stable so that even the RW model, which is a completely
uninteresting model for policy analysis, beats the other models. There is obviously some luck
involved in this race as the theoretical distributions of the DSGE-JKKL and RW models suggest
signiﬁcantly higher RMSEs at horizons as long as 4 or 8 quarters. It would be interesting to see
why the DSGE-JKKL model performs poorly at short horizons, but then dominates at longer
horizons. Weplantostudytheseissuesfurtherbyreplacingthemodel’sspeciﬁcationofinﬂation
dynamics with the standard Calvo model with lagged indexation to see if this accounts for the
difference in forecasting performance between DSGE-JKKL and DSGE-EKL over this period.
5.2.4 Some Caveats and Future Work
It is important to emphasize that the forecasts from the DSGE-JKKL model have an advantage
over the models considered by EKL. First, EKL derive real-time forecasting errors by using the
historical data that was available at the time, while our estimates are based on the revised data
available now. 26 Second, because of data limitations for our measure of long-term inﬂation
expectations, which only starts in 1990, we use estimates of parameter values that are based
on the whole sample.27 EKL, which do not use these measures of long-term inﬂation expec-
tations to control for time variation in underlying inﬂation objectives, can be more careful by
conducting a real-time forecasting exercise. In fact, they use parameter estimates that are only
based on available data and then update them once a year after the ﬁrst major revisions to the
data from the national accounts. It is unclear how much this affects our results so we plan to
explore these issues further in a separate paper, which will focus exclusively on the real-time
forecasting accuracy of the model.
We are also interested in developing a better methodology for doing comparisons with the fore-
casts from DSGE models and other methods. While reduced-form methods or judgmental fore-
casts may have an advantage for near-term forecasting, the DSGE models are much more useful
for policy simulations since there is an endogenous determination of the policy rate that is nec-
essary to bring inﬂation back to the underlying target. For example, even if an RW model was
25 The framework used by EKL is quite standard and involves augmenting the basic Calvo model with lagged
indexation. We are in the process of estimating a version of our model with this speciﬁcation for inﬂation dynamics
to compare the marginal data densities from both models.
26 Each Greenbook forecast database from August 1996 also contains the historical time series in a FAME database
so it is straightforward for researchers at the Fed to control for historical revisions. This is an extension we hope
to do in the future once we get access to the initial data. Unfortunately we just learned that these data are readily
availablefromthewebsiteoftheSt. LouisFed. Theproblemassociatedwithhistoricalrevisionsmaybesigniﬁcant
for many series in the national accounts, but is not a problem for the Fed funds rate as these data are not revised. As
far as we know researchers have not quantiﬁed the importance of historical revisions with the objective of showing
how this additional source of uncertainty affects forecasting accuracy at different horizons in DSGE models.
27 EKL’s data sample started in 1984 providing a large enough sample where they could start rolling the estimation
forward from 1996. We are in the process of trying to do the estimation starting in 1990, but obviously our initial
sample will be quite short so we do not know how this is going to pan out.26 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
found to forecast inﬂation better than a DSGE model over say an 8-quarter horizon, it would
provide no useful information for policydeliberations that were aimed at deciding on the current
and expected future path of the policy rate. However, less structured methods may be useful for
very near-term forecasts for those variables where there is likely to be little feedback between
the policy rate and the variable that is being predicted. For example, a real forecast of US GDP
for the 1st quarter of a year that was being conducted in March can probably safely ignore the
implications of a small rate hike in March. However, it is unclear what beneﬁts forecasts over
longer horizons have for policy deliberations unless they spell out clearly the linkages between
the policy rate and the objectives of monetary policy. A method that combined judgmental near-
term forecasts or atheoretical methods with the forecasts from DSGE models would be a very
useful tool for inﬂation-targeting central banks as it would allow them to quantify the beneﬁts of
judgment and help them to distinguish between the predictable and unpredictable components
of monetary policy.
5.3 DSGE-JKKL Forecasting Performance
The analysis above compared DSGE-JKKL with other forecasts over a limited sample period
studied by EKL and only for GDP, the GDP deﬂator and the Fed funds rate. Next, we extend
our analysis by examining the root mean square errors (RMSEs) over more horizons and for all
the observable variables in the model. Table 7.9 reports RMSEs for 1, 4, and 12 quarters ahead.
The ﬁrst set of numbers in each column reports the estimates based on the complete historical
sample that dates back to the early 1990s, while the estimates in parentheses are derived from
the theoretical distributions of the model. It is important to emphasize that this analysis of the
errors does not account for uncertainty in parameters, but focuses simply on uncertainty in the
underlying shocks.28
The presence of a unit root in both inﬂation and productivity will imply that the RMSEs will
become larger as the forecast horizon is extended. For example, the theoretical RMSEs for
inﬂation rise from 0.72 for forecasts 1 quarter ahead to 1.54 for forecasts that are 12 quarters
ahead. At short horizons (1 to 4 quarters ahead) the model does a reasonable job at forecasting
inﬂation developments.29 Interestingly, the RMSEs based on the historical data are smaller at
longer horizons than what is suggested by a pure unit root speciﬁcation for inﬂation objectives.
This should not be surprising as this unit-root assumption for inﬂation objectives is designed
to simply account for permanent reductions in inﬂation objectives from the higher values at
the beginning of the sample. Obviously, given that the Fed is committed to maintaining low
and stable inﬂation we would expect that the actual RMSEs at longer horizons would start to
stabilize at some point. 30
The RMSEs for the real variables also widen at longer forecast horizons and in most cases
provideplausibleestimatesofforecastuncertainty, whileinothercasestheysuggestweaknesses
in the model’s structure and properties. For example, while the RMSEs for GDP expand in a
plausible way, the theoretical RMSEs particularly for investment seem to expand too quickly,
28 We are in the process of extending the analysis to allow for uncertainty in parameters.
29 Remember inﬂation is measured at annual rates, or more precisely 400 times the ﬁrst difference of the GDP
deﬂator. Considering the signiﬁcant near-term volatility in the GDP deﬂator an RMSE of these magnitudes
suggests that the model might be a serious contender among competing models of the US inﬂation process.
30 While the Fed does not have explicit numerical objectives for inﬂation it is clear from its communications and
actions that it intends to keep inﬂation in a range that is low enough to prevent costly distortions and high enough
to guard against periods of deﬂation. The RMSEs for advanced inﬂation-targeting countries, which have explicit
numerical objectives that are designed to anchor long-term inﬂation expectations, typically stabilize faster and at
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and indeed in this case the RMSE based on the actual forecasts 3 years ahead is substantially
lower than the RMSE based on the theoretical distributions of the model (8.81 versus 19.78).
We think this may be related to a fundamental weakness in these types of models because
they do not allow for sufﬁcient positive correlation between consumption and investment. For
example, Juillard and others (2005) address this problem by simply allowing the consumption
and investment shocks in their model to be positively correlated.31 We have not performed
a formal comparison of these forecast errors for all variables with other structural models or
judgmentalmethods, butatthispointourforecasterrorsfortheFedfundsrateseemsigniﬁcantly
worse than from the futures market, suggesting that there may be valuable information in the
futures market to help identify the parameters of the reaction function and the underlying shocks
driving the US economy.
5.4 Accounting for Very Near-Term Forecasting Errors
Figures 7.16 to 7.24 report 1-quarter-ahead forecasts for output, inﬂation and the Fed funds rate,
which are based on information that starts in 1990Q3 and ends in 2005Q4. The middle panel of
these ﬁgures reports the forecast errors for each 1-quarter-ahead forecast and the bottom panel
decomposes these forecast errors into the 10 underlying shocks. In the middle panel of each
ﬁgure we have included lines that are equal to plus or minus 2 RMSEs to provide an indication
if the forecasting error is particularly large. In the bottom panel we have color coded the shock
contributions as follows. The ﬁve cold colors (black and the two shades of blue and green)
signify demand shocks because they generate positive covariance between GDP and inﬂation.
Bycontrastthefourhotcolors(yellow, orange, red, andbrown)representsupplyshocksbecause
they generate negative covariance between GDP and inﬂation. For a simple example about how
to interpret each set of the charts please turn to Figure 7.16, which reports data for per capita
GDP over the sample from 1990Q3 to 1995Q1. It shows per capita GDP is falling at the very
beginning of the sample and the forecasts based on data up to 1990Q3 overpredict it by over
3/4 of a percent—see the negative black bar in the middle panel. As can be seen in the bottom
panel, this forecast error was a result of negative demand shocks (hot colors) that reduced output
by considerably more than other shocks that raised it. From examining the bottom panels of
Figures 7.16 to 7.18 and 7.22 to 7.24 it can be seen that most of the unpredictable short-run
variation in GDP and the Fed funds rate is a result of demand shocks (the hot colors) while for
inﬂation it is supply shocks—see the cold colors at the bottom of Figures 7.19 to 7.21.
Turning to the ﬁgures on GDP it can be seen that there can be pretty signiﬁcant forecasting
errors, particularly around turning points such as the two NBER-dated recessions (1990Q4-
1991Q1 and 2001Q2-2001Q4), as well as in other periods when output growth either signiﬁ-
cantly exceeded or fell below trend growth. To summarize, while DSGE models can provide
a useful framework for better understanding macro dynamics and the types of shocks driving
the economy they seem to forecast the economy equally as badly as other mechanical tech-
niques during turning points. It will be interesting to compare these particular forecasts with
the Greenbook forecasts when the ﬁgures for 2001 are released early next year.
5.4.1 What Quarters Had Large Errors?
For per capita GDP there were four forecasting errors that were greater than 2 RMSEs and
three of them occurred near the beginning of the sample. First, the forecast for GDP growth in
1990Q4 was expected to be positive and instead it fell quite signiﬁcantly, producing an error
31 We are in the process of reestimating the model to see if this would work here, but at this point do not have any
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of -1.3 percent. The forecast for the following quarter was almost spot on, but then the model
forecasts a continued fall in GDP that was not realized. It is this transition from recessions to
recoveries that the model seems to miss completely. The next large forecasting error was for
1993Q1, which also marked a fall in per capital GDP, while the model would have suggested a
fairly strong quarter. The only other really large forecasting error was for 2000Q3, when growth
was signiﬁcantly lower than projected.
There were three large forecasting errors for inﬂation where inﬂation was above 2 RMSEs.
This occurred towards the end of the sample in 2003Q1, 2004Q1 and 2005Q2. In all three cases
there were signiﬁcant increases in the prices of nondurables and the government deﬂator. Again
it will be interesting to see if the Greenbook forecasts, which are based on more detailed and
timely information, were more accurate at forecasting inﬂation in these quarters.
There were three large forecasting errors for the Fed funds rate that were below 2 RMSEs. This
wasin1998Q4, whenthemodelpredictsanincrease, buttheFedfundsratewascut. Second, the
model does not predict the cuts in interest rates in 2001, when there were two large forecasting
errors in 2001Q1 and 2001Q4, but it also overpredicted interest rates signiﬁcantly in the two
other quarters in 2001. In addition, there is a string of negative errors over the next 2 years.
Obviously, the model does not adequately capture concerns that Fed policymakers had about
deﬂation and it is unclear at this point how to extend a linear DSGE model to capture such
effects without producing signiﬁcant computational costs and complexity.
5.5 Revisions in Medium-Term Forecasts
To understand how the model’s medium-term forecasts are revised in response to new data we
have included Figures 7.25 to 7.33, which show each forecast up to 12 quarters into the future
for GDP per capita, inﬂation and the Fed funds rate. However, rather than reporting forecasting
errors and their decomposition, the middle panel of these ﬁgures reports how much the forecasts
12 quarters ahead are revised based on one quarter of new data and the bottom panel reports
what shocks account for these revisions. To do the comparison we create a forecast 12 quarters
ahead, update the information set by one quarter and then compare the difference between the
forecast 11 quarters ahead with the previous forecast that was made 12 quarters ahead. The
bottom and middle panels are lined up by the values at the end of the forecast, but are based on
the arrival of new data 12 quarters preceding each of these quarters.
6. Using the Model’s Forecasts to Create Trend-Cycle Decompositions
In this section we exploit the forecasting performance of the model to develop more reliable
real-time measures of the output gap using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter. We do this by
using the model’s forecasts for per capita GDP in each quarter to construct 2-sided measures of
the output gap. After presenting the estimates of this procedure over the last 5 years we then
show the beneﬁts of this procedure by comparing how its measures at the end of each historical
sample period would be revised after the real data are released and the model’s forecasts are
replaced with actual observations.32
32 It is well known that univariate ﬁlters such as the HP ﬁlter give very imprecise estimates of the output gap at the
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6.1 Estimates of Output Gaps
Figure 7.34 presents the gaps under six values of the HP smoothing parameter that range from
600 to 5600 in increments of 1000. These estimates were constructed by taking the model’s
forecasts for GDP per capita for the next 5 years and then detrending the data based on an
endpoint of 2010Q4. The ﬁgure also includes estimates of the output gap from the FRBUS
model as a set of reference values. The series all suggest positive values of the output gap in
early 2000 that then decline and become negative shortly after the economy is hit by a recession
in the ﬁrst quarter of 2001. The gaps then trough between -1 and -2 percent before starting to
recover in 2003Q3. After this period the output gap gradually closes as the economy recovers
from the recession and by the end of the sample all estimates suggest that the output gap has
turned slightly positive. The estimates from the FRBUS models suggest much larger positive
values of the output gap in 2000, but then the FRBUS estimates are broadly similar over the last
three years.
6.2 Historical Revisions in Output Gaps
The ﬁrst column of table 7.10 shows the RMSE difference between the end-of-sample one-sided
estimates from the HP ﬁlter and the ﬁnal 2-sided estimates, which have the beneﬁt of hindsight
in that ”future values” of the GDP per capita are used in the calculations. The second column
of table 7.10 reports similar estimates, but in this case the end-of-sample estimates from the
extended HP ﬁlter are based on forecasts from the model. As can be seen there is a signiﬁcant
improvement using the forecasts of the DSGE model to help condition the estimates, with the
RMSEs falling between .35 and .62 depending on what HP smoothing parameter is chosen.
As indicated earlier the forecasting performance of the DSGE model is weaker during turning
points so while we might expect its trend-cycle decomposition to be somewhat better during
recessions and recoveries it will be anything but a panacea. Figure 7.35 shows the real-time
updating of the trend estimates from the HP ﬁlter (assuming a smoothing parameter equal to
1600) between 2000Q1 and 2002Q4 and then compares the gaps with the ﬁnal gaps that are
based on information up to 2005Q4. This charts shows clearly how the trend estimates from
the HP ﬁlter are adjusted during a business cycle, starting at high levels during a peak and
then being revised down systematically over time only to be revised up again if the economy
recovers strongly from a trough. Figure 7.36, which reports the extended HP estimates based on
the forecasts of the DSGE model, shows the beneﬁts of using forecasts from the DSGE model.
In this case the downward revisions in the estimates occur faster and stabilize faster, suggesting
the providing of a better signal that the previous peak in activity was not sustainable.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a New Keynesian DSGE model that, based on our preliminary
Bayesian estimation results, looks promising for addressing some key problems of this model
class. The ﬁt and out-of-sample forecasting properties of the model are quite competitive when
compared to other methods, and we therefore have some conﬁdence in the model’s ability to
ﬁt the data. After evaluating the model’s ability to forecast we exploit the model’s forecasting
performance to develop measures of output gaps that are more reliable at the end of the sample.
However, more work needs to be done to distinguish what features contribute to the overall ﬁt
of the model and what features are nonessential. In future work we aim to expand further on
this analysis in a number of directions and then extend it to include open-economy and multi-
country dimensions.30 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
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Table 7.1: Speciﬁcation of the Stochastic Processes
Assumptions about the Shocks Stochastic Processes
Total Factor Productivity b gt = b g
gr
t + b giid
t
Demand Shocks
Government Absorption d s
gov
t = ½govd s
gov




t = ½invd sinv
t¡1 + ^ "inv
t
Marginal Utility of Consumption b sc
t = ½cd sc
t¡1 + ^ "c
t
Monetary Policy Reaction Function c sint
t = ½intd sint
t¡1 + ^ "int
t
Inﬂation Target ^ ¼¤
t = ^ ¼¤
t¡1 + ^ "¼¤
t
Autocorrelated Growth Shocks b g
gr
t = ½grb g
gr




Price Markup b ¹t = ^ "
¹
t
Wage Markup c ¹w
t = ^ "
¹w
t
Marginal Disutility of Labor b sL
t = ½Ld sL
t¡1 + ^ "L
t
I.i.d. Growth Shocks b giid
t = ^ "iid
t
Table 7.2: Estimation Results
Parameters
Prior Estimate Std Density Prior Std
v 0.85 0.73 0.058 Beta 0.10
° 0.50 0.50 0.089 Normal 0.10
± 0.66 0.71 0.033 Beta 0.10
±w 0.66 0.59 0.046 Beta 0.10
±k 0.66 0.68 0.10 Beta 0.10
Á 1.00 1.03 0.19 Normal 0.20
Áw 1.00 0.96 0.20 Normal 0.20
Ák 1.00 1.00 0.19 Normal 0.20
µk 5.00 5.31 0.97 Normal 1.00
µi 50.00 52.95 8.74 Normal 10.00
»int 0.75 0.95 0.043 Normal 0.10
»¼ 0.25 0.32 0.066 Normal 0.10
»y 0.50 0.34 0.072 Normal 0.20
² 0.50 0.48 0.23 Gamma 0.25
¹ g 1.0042 1.0058 0.0018 Normal 0.008
gs 0.18 0.23 0.029 Beta 0.04
¾ 5.35 5.28 0.95 Gamma 1.00
¾k 11.0 10.79 1.98 Gamma 2.00
¾w 7.25 6.30 1.30 Gamma 1.50
¢ 0.025 0.027 0.0076 Gamma 0.01
ls 0.58 0.64 0.036 Beta 0.2034 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
Table 7.3: Estimation Results Continued
Parameters
Prior Estimate Std Density Prior Std
½gov 0.85 0.99 0.037 Beta 0.10
½inv 0.85 0.75 0.068 Beta 0.10
½c 0.85 0.92 0.032 Beta 0.10
½int 0.85 0.53 0.083 Beta 0.10
½gr 0.95 0.95 0.01 Beta 0.01
½L 0.85 0.99 0.0053 Beta 0.10
Table 7.4: Estimation Results Continued
Standard Deviation of Shocks
Prior Estimate Std Density Prior Std
¾^ "gov 0.025 0.0089 0.015 invg inf
¾^ "inv 0.2000 0.058 0.010 invg inf
¾^ "c 0.0250 0.0227 0.0062 invg inf
¾^ "int 0.0100 0.0036 0.0004 invg inf
¾^ "¼¤ 0.1000 0.020 0.0019 invg inf
¾^ "iid 0.0010 0.0058 0.0006 invg inf
¾^ "gr 0.2000 0.0824 0.0261 invg inf
¾^ "L 0.0050 0.0227 0.0063 invg inf
¾^ "¹ 0.0250 0.0298 0.0064 invg inf
¾^ "¹w 0.0250 0.1387 0.0304 invg inf
Table 7.5: Comparison of Marginal Likelihoods with BVARs
Marginal Likelihood
Base Case Model (MH-500,000 Draws) -352.20
BVAR (1 lag) -388.99
BVAR (2 lag) -362.14
BVAR (3 lag) -358.94
BVAR (4 lag) -355.16
BVAR (5 lag) -360.39
BVAR (6 lag) -365.56
BVAR (7 lag) -370.07
BVAR (8 lag) -375.46Measures of Potential Output 35
Table 7.6: GDP RMSEs for Alternative Models
Forecast Horizon
1 Quarter 4 Quarters 8 Quarters
DSGE-JKKL 0.49 0.89 2.00
DSGE-EKL 0.53 1.50 3.55
BVAR 0.37 1.30 3.03
VAR 0.42 1.23 2.85
RW 0.49 1.75 3.92
GB 0.44 2.13 4.13
Table 7.7: GDP Deﬂator RMSEs for Alternative Models
Forecast Horizon
1 Quarter 4 Quarters 8 Quarters
DSGE-JKKL 0.18 0.66 1.55
DSGE-EKL 0.24 1.19 2.54
BVAR 0.23 0.79 1.67
VAR 0.23 0.71 1.67
RW 0.24 0.96 1.43
GB 0.20 0.62 1.2936 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
Table 7.8: Fed Funds Rate RMSEs for Alternative Models
Forecast Horizon
1 Quarter 4 Quarters 8 Quarters
DSGE-JKKL 0.25 0.57 0.45
DSGE-EKL 0.12 0.57 1.25
BVAR 0.10 0.65 1.27
VAR 0.11 0.82 1.72
RW 0.11 0.61 0.76
GB na na na
Table 7.9: RMSEs at Different Forecast Horizons
Historical and Theoretical Values (in parentheses)
1 Quarter 4 Quarters 12 Quarters
Inﬂation 0.80 (0.72) 0.84 (0.99) 1.31 (1.54)
Fed Funds Rate 0.33 (0.34) 1.22 (0.99) 2.28 (1.80)
Hours 0.41 (0.51) 1.37 (1.52) 3.44 (2.99)
GDP 0.53 (0.51) 1.48 (1.73) 2.98 (3.98)
Consumption 0.57 (0.59) 1.36 (2.25) 2.72 (5.18)
Investment 2.58 (2.69) 5.68 (9.81) 8.81 (19.78)
Real Wage 0.59 (0.59) 1.50 (1.45) 3.12 (3.14)
Long-Term Inﬂation Expectations 0.07 (0.08) 0.20 (0.17) 0.42 (0.28)Measures of Potential Output 37
Table 7.10: RMSE Differences Between Real Time HP Filter Gaps and Final Estimates
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Figure 7.1: Measures of Long-Term Inﬂation Expectations and Interest Rates
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Figure 7.2: Measures of Expected Long-Term Growth
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Figure 7.3: Shock to the Fed Funds Rate (Demand)
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Figure 7.4: Shock to the Inﬂation Objective (Demand)
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Figure 7.5: Shock to Government Absorption (Demand)
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Figure 7.6: Shock to Consumption (Demand)
























































Hours Worked44 M. Juillard, O. Kamen´ ık, M. Kumhof and D. Laxton
Figure 7.7: Shock to Investment (Demand)
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Figure 7.8: Shock to Wage Markup (Supply)
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Figure 7.9: Shock to Price Markup (Supply)
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Figure 7.10: Shock to Labor Effort (Supply)
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Figure 7.11: Shock to Productivity Level (Supply)
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Figure 7.12: Shock to Productivity Growth (Demand)
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Figure 7.13: Inﬂation Target Shock and Inﬂation Dynamics
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Figure 7.15: Estimated Shocks to the Inﬂation Target












EE_PAISTARMeasures of Potential Output 53
Figure 7.16: GDP Forecast Errors 1990Q3-1995Q2
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Figure 7.17: GDP Forecast Errors 1995Q3-2000Q2






ZZ_GDP 1 periods ahead (2)
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Figure 7.18: GDP Forecast Errors 2000Q3-2005Q4





ZZ_GDP 1 periods ahead (3)
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Figure 7.19: Inﬂation Forecast Errors 1990Q3-1995Q2
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Figure 7.20: Inﬂation Forecast Errors 1995Q3-2000Q2
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Figure 7.21: Inﬂation Forecast Errors 2000Q3-2006Q1





ZZ_PAI 1 periods ahead (3)
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Figure 7.22: Fed Funds Rate Forecast Errors 1990Q3-1995Q2
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Figure 7.23: Fed Funds Rate Forecast Errors 1995Q3-2000Q2





ZZ_INT 1 periods ahead (2)
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Figure 7.24: Fed Funds Rate Forecast Errors 2000Q3-2005Q4
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Figure 7.25: GDP Medium-Term Forecast Revisions 1990Q3-1998Q1
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Figure 7.26: GDP Medium-Term Forecast Revisions 1995Q3-2003Q1





ZZ_GDP 12 periods ahead (2)
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Figure 7.27: GDP Medium-Term Forecast Revisions 2000Q3-2008Q3





ZZ_GDP 12 periods ahead (3)
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Figure 7.28: Inﬂation Medium-Term Forecast Revisions 1990Q3-1998Q1
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Figure 7.29: Inﬂation Medium-Term Forecast Revisions 1995Q3-2003Q1
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Figure 7.30: Inﬂation Medium-Term Forecast Revisions 2000Q3-2008Q3
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Figure 7.31: Fed Funds Rate Medium-Term Forecast Revisions 1990Q3-1998Q1
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Figure 7.32: Fed Funds Rate Medium-Term Forecast Revisions 1995Q3-2003Q1





ZZ_INT 12 periods ahead (2)
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Figure 7.33: Fed Funds Rate Medium-Term Forecast Revisions 2000Q3-2008Q3
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Figure 7.34: Extended HP Output Gaps Under Different Smoothing Parameters
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Figure 7.35: Real-Time HP Trends and Output Gaps (2000Q1-2002Q4)
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Figure 7.36: Real-Time Extended HP Trends and Output Gaps (2000Q1-2002Q4)
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